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While data ownership can theoretically be accommo-
dated fairly easily within the framework of demateri-
alised property, there are several reasons, both the-
oretical and from a legal policy perspective, which 
make the introduction of data ownership modelled 
upon conventional (intellectual) property rights prob-
lematic.
Abstract:  Debts, (electronic) money, intellec-
tual property, and, in principle, data and digitised ob-
jects (if ownership rights are to be recognised for 
these), can be conceptualised as versions of the gen-
eral principle of dematerialised property. This article 
discusses first the concept of dematerialised prop-
erty and its application to debts, money and intel-
lectual property. Then it deals with the idea of own-
ership of data within traditional property concepts. 
A. Introduction 
1 The modern economy relies more and more on 
intangible assets, whether financial assets (ultimately 
a form of debt, particularly in its most significant 
version: money), or intellectual property and data, 
while the production and sale of physical goods and 
assets becomes less important. Some commentators 
seem to suggest that the law of property struggles 
when it tries to keep up with these developments. In 
fact, an underlying concept of modern property law 
systems appears well-equipped to meet these new 
challenges, and although lawyers hardly address 
this concept specifically, it is in reality impliedly 
accepted: the concept of dematerialised property. 
This concept will be discussed in the following 
article, with some of its most important practical 
applications: debts, money, intellectual property, 
and, at least potentially, data and digitised objects.
2 First, one has to explain how the term ‘property’ 
is used and understood in the following discussion. 
The English word ‘property’, also in its technical-
legal meaning, is ambiguous,1 and at the start of 
the discussion it is necessary to define the term 
‘property’ as follows: ‘property’ means (a) assets 
or wherewithal or ‘patrimonium’ of a person, (b) 
property right, (c) property object or ‘thing’ or res 
(the latter term will be used in the following), and, 
finally, (d) ‘ownership’, although this meaning is 
imprecise and should better be avoided.2 
* Professor of Commercial Law at the School of Law of the 
University of Glasgow, UK.
1 See also Lutz-Christian Wolff, ‘The relationship between 
contract law and property law’, (2020) 49(1) Common Law 
World Review, 34-36.
2 Andreas Rahmatian, Lord Kames. Legal and Social Theorist 
(Edinburgh University Press, 2015) 221-224.
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Relevant for the following discussion are meanings 
(b) and (c) – property right and property object. It will 
become clear that in the concept of dematerialised 
property3 ‘property right’ and ‘property object’ are 
in fact interchangeable terms. 
B. The concept of 
dematerialised property
3 Different legal systems have different definitions of 
property rights, but historically property objects or 
‘things’ in law have generally been regarded as being 
physical things, at least initially. In German law, 
property or things (Sachen) are indeed only physical 
objects (§ 90 German Civil Code, BGB),4 but that 
forces Germany to recognise debts (Forderungen)5 
and intellectual property rights as quasi-property 
in effect,6 so that functionally this narrow definition 
of property, which seems to have developed rather 
fortuitously and can be traced back to a particular 
romanist interpretation of property by the German 
3 See Andreas Rahmatian, ‘Intellectual Property and the 
Concept of Dematerialised Property’, in: Sue Bright (ed.), 
Modern Studies in Property Law, vol. 6 (Hart Publishing, 
2011) 361-383, at 361; Rahmatian, Lord Kames (n 2) 228-230; 
Andreas Rahmatian, Credit and Creed. A Critical Legal Theory of 
Money (Routledge, 2020) 6-18.
4 § 90 BGB: ‘Sachen im Sinne des Gesetzes sind nur körperliche 
Gegenstände.’ Similar Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk 
Wetboek), art 5:1: ownership refers to corporeal objects.
5 This becomes apparent in the situation of the assignment of 
debts or claims (Forderungsabtretung), where the attribution 
to a creditor is changed, which requires the application of 
a quasi-proprietarian speciality principle, like with actual 
property rights, see e.g. Dieter Medicus, Schuldrecht I. 
Allgemeiner Teil, 14th ed. (C. H. Beck, 2003) 350, for Germany. 
Transferability is generally an indication of the existence of 
a property right, at least functionally, see for English law, 
Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th 
ed. (Oxford University Press, 2009) 96-98.
6 In the case of intellectual property rights, these are 
Immaterialgüterrechte (literally, ‘rights of incorporeal goods’), 
see for Germany and the German author’s rights law which, 
due to its strong personal component, is not regarded 
as a true property right, Vogel in Gerhard Schricker (ed.) 
Urheberrecht. Kommentar, 4th ed. (C. H. Beck, 2010) 58, n 26: 
‘quasi-dingliches Recht’, on the historical development, ibid 
at 86, n 109; Schulze in Thomas Dreier and Gernot Schulze, 
Urheberrechtsgesetz. Kommentar, 5th ed. (C. H. Beck, 2015) 
79, n 11: the notion that the work that is protected by the 
author’s right (‘copyright’) is made concrete or is realised in 
the physical piece of work (ibid), already hints at the idea of 
dematerialised property, see below.
Historical School in the nineteenth century,7 is 
really upheld in practice. The treatment of licences 
in German author’s rights law (Urheberrecht) makes 
the interpretation of such property-like sui generis 
rights as ‘quasi-property’ particularly apparent.8 
More practical is a wide definition of property, for 
example in Austria’s § 285 of the General Civil Code 
(ABGB), which stipulates that everything that is 
different from the human being and serves the use 
of man, is a thing or res in law.9 A similar approach is 
taken in other jurisdictions, for example in France,10 
England11 or Scotland.12 Accordingly, property 
objects can be corporeal as well as incorporeal, or, in 
the terminology of English law, tangible, intangible 
and purely intangible. ‘Pure intangibles’ denotes 
property created as legal concepts, for example debts 
or intellectual property rights, while ‘intangibles’ can 
also mean intangible objects of the physical world, 
such as gas or electricity.13 Although theoretically 
corporeal (both moveable and immoveable) and 
incorporeal property are only sub-categories of the 
same legal concept of property (unitary concept of 
property), the different legal systems are bound to 
take account of the (non-)physicality of a res and to 
provide adequate provisions, for example in relation 
to the acquisition of possession or ownership or
7 Maximilian Haedicke, Rechtskauf und Rechtsmängelhaftung 
(Mohr Siebeck, 2003) 35.
8 While the author’s right itself and its exploitation rights 
(Verwertungsrechte) are not transferable in German law (see 
German § 29 (1) Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965), the licences 
(Nutzungsrechte) granted under an existing author’s right 
are transferable, with author’s consent (which cannot be 
withheld in bad faith, German § 34 (1) Urheberrechtsgesetz 
1965), see Schricker/Loewenheim in Schricker (n 6) 581, n 
50.
9 § 285 ABGB: ‘Alles, was von der Person unterschieden 
ist, und zum Gebrauche der Menschen dient, wird im 
rechtlichen Sinne eine Sache genannt.’
10 François Terré and Philippe Simler, Droit civil: Les biens, 9th 
ed. (Dalloz, 2014) 43. 
11 E.g. Michael Bridge, Personal Property Law, 4rd ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2015) 13-16: choses in possession (tangible 
chattels), choses in action (debts), (pure) intangibles.
12 Kenneth G. C. Reid (and contributors), The Law of Property 
in Scotland (Butterworths, 1996) 17, 22, para. 11 and note 4, 
para. 16.
13 Bridge (n 11) 13, 16. In reality the distinction between ‘pure 
intangibles’ and ‘intangibles’ is often not strictly made.
2020
Andreas Rahmatian
188 2
the grant of security rights over property, which 
reflect the tangible or intangible nature of the res 
in question.14 That problem will not be discussed in 
the present context.
4 On this basis, one can develop the property 
concept further. Property is not primarily a 
connection between a person and an object, but 
a legal relationship between persons with regard 
to things (relational concept of property).15 The 
law determines what this proprietary relationship 
consists of, by essentially ordering a specific 
behaviour towards persons in respect of things 
which makes them ‘their’ things. This is commonly 
referred to as the property right (or ‘real right’16), 
the subjective exclusive right to a res, enforceable 
erga omnes17 (in English law: ‘a property right binds 
the world’)18 different from, and independent of, an 
underlying contractual relationship that would only 
bind the contracting parties.19 The property right 
of ownership, being the most extensive property 
right,20 is enforced by the owner against, for example, 
the trespasser or the thief in relation to a res, such as 
14 For an ownership transfer, physical delivery is possible 
in relation to moveable property (or, if unsuitable, 
through symbols), or change of registration in case of 
land/immoveable property, or information of the debtor 
(intimation) to perfect the transfer of a claim/debt in case of 
an assignment (depending on the jurisdiction in question).
15 The relational concept of property is not a new theory, 
although some sociologically informed authors seem to 
suggest this, but can be traced back to the eighteenth century 
at least, see in particular Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der 
Sitten, Wilhelm Weischedel (ed.), (Werkausgabe Band VIII) 
(Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1977) 371-372. For more 
discussion, see e.g. Rahmatian, Lord Kames (n 2) 225-226. 
It is rather a truism that property rights are ultimately 
enforceable only against persons, see e.g. Reid (n 12) 8, para. 
3.
16 Here the term ‘real’ has to be understood in its original 
Latin meaning, from which also the word res (‘thing’) 
derives. The words ‘real estate’ and the technical term for 
land/immoveable property in English law, ‘real property’, 
are examples of that.
17 Franz Bydlinski, System und Prinzipien des Privatrechts 
(Springer Verlag, 1996) 315-318.
18 E. g. Bridge (n 11) 1-4.
19 Bydlinski (n 17) 171-172, 174.
20 There are of course more limited, or subordinate real 
rights, such as the pledge, the mortgage or real security 
or hypothec (the exact terminology depends on the 
jurisdiction in question), the easement or servitude (such as 
a right of way) and so on. This is not discussed further.
a plot of land or a watch as an instance of that res (on 
the idea of the ‘instance’, see immediately below).21 
Thus ‘property’ is the creature of the law; there are 
no ‘natural’ property rights,22 in contrast to some 
natural law theories of property. The exclusive rights 
to a res, the property rights or real rights, actually 
create the property or res by protecting it erga omnes. 
There are evidently physical objects in the natural 
world, either as natural or as man-made products, 
like an apple or a car, but they are only recognised 
by, and incorporated in, the system of the law by 
(potentially)23 attaching property rights to them: 
only then they are objects or ‘things’ for the purpose 
of the law, otherwise they are non-existent for the 
law. This is therefore an entirely constructivist 
idea of property: it is the law that makes the object 
to a thing or res in law and therefore ‘constructs’ 
it as ‘real’ from a legal perspective. The physical 
existence of an object in the natural world is not 
legally imperative.
5 Consequently, the res is a legal construct that is 
‘filled’ by physical objects of whichever kind, being 
a field, a car, or a book. These are concrete instances 
of the res, that is, the legal conception that turns 
physical objects into ‘property’, or more precisely, 
property objects in law, a process which one can 
call, somewhat unattractively, ‘propertisation’. The 
res as such is only res because of the property rights 
attached to it: by turning physical objects into res 
they incorporate the object of the natural world 
(the ‘is’) into the normative world of the law (the 
‘ought’). In fact, the physical object of property only 
represents, but does not constitute, the res which is 
the legal concept of ‘property object’. This physical 
object operates as a ‘social reifier’ of the res, being a 
material representation of an abstract legal concept. 
It becomes clear again that the physicality of the 
object representing the legal notion of the res is 
conceptually unnecessary. Therefore, the res may 
be represented by a physical thing, but equally it 
21 In the present context, the nature or content of real rights, 
such as ownership, is not discussed. For the ‘internal side’ of 
real rights, see e.g. Rahmatian, Dematerialised Property (n 3) 
366-367.
22 This follows ultimately Jeremy Bentham, see Jeremy 
Bentham, ‘Principles of the Civil Code’, in: The Theory of 
Legislation, 7th ed. (R. Hildreth, trans.) (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trübner, 1891) 88-236, at 111-113, and David Hume, see 
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book 3, part 2, L. A. 
Selby-Bigge (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1960) 491.
23 This comprises cases of res nullius where currently there 
is no property right attached in a given case but could be 
established through finding, occupation etc.
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can be made concrete in the form of a non-physical 
legal concept itself, the most practical example being 
intellectual property rights.24
6 This is the idea of dematerialised property: the ‘ought’ 
of the res need not be materialised as an ‘is’ in form of 
a physical object as a social reifier that may indicate 
socially the adhering legal real right – this is in fact 
insignificant. Human behavioural patterns creating 
property rights may be supported by physical objects 
– for example the social act of delivery of a thing 
(traditio) for denoting the transfer of ownership in 
that thing to a new owner – but the actual real right 
(including attribution changes of that right) and 
the res it thereby creates through the proprietary 
protection of that very res are independent of any 
physicality. As the real right creates the res, the 
normative terms ‘property right’ and ‘property 
object’ are conceptually interchangeable. With 
regard to intellectual property, this is obvious: the 
terms ‘intellectual property right’ and ‘intellectual 
property’ are indeed equivalent, also in practical 
use. As far as corporeal property is concerned, the 
expression ‘property right’ denotes more the real 
right to the thing, while the term ‘property’ (in the 
specific meaning of ‘thing’) emphasises the property 
object represented by a physical thing, such as a 
chattel. Conceptually, however, right and ‘thing’ 
(here understood as the legal concept of the res) are 
substitutable also in the case of tangible property, 
as explained before.
7 This idea of normative dematerialisation makes 
the following argument, often found in property 
theory, in fact irrelevant: that intellectual property 
rights – and also data, for that matter25 – are non-
rivalrous goods, unlike physical property, and are 
therefore not actual property. The legal question 
is not whether the consumption of the good by one 
individual does (not) prevent or reduce availability 
of the good for consumption by others, but whether 
there is a normative creation of ‘property’, or a res, 
and that applies to tangible and intangible property 
alike: in this way, the rivalrous nature is normatively 
ordered, not legally acknowledged in line with 
existing physical circumstances.26 In copyright, 
protection is not granted for ‘ideas’ that are non-
24 Rahmatian, Dematerialised Property (n 3) 371.
25 Francesco Banterle, ‘ Data Ownership in the Data Economy: 
A European Dilemma’, in: T.-E. Synodinou et al. (eds), 
EU Internet Law in the Digital Era (Springer International 
Publishing, 2020) 199-225, at 213; Thomas Hoeren and Philip 
Bitter, ‘Data ownership is dead: long live data ownership’, 
(2018) 40 (6) European Intellectual Property Review, 347.
26 Andreas Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity: The Making of 
Property Rights in Creative Works (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2011) 103, in relation to copyright.
rivalrous, but for distinct individual expressions 
of the author who uses and shapes these ideas, 
and it is their expression and the legal protection 
by copyright attached to them, which creates 
normatively the rivalrous good (if one wants to 
adhere to this concept for pure intangibles at all). In 
this regard the same would have to apply for data, so 
the problem of proprietary protection of data cannot 
be solved on this basis.
C. Applications of dematerialised 
property I: debts, (electronic) 
money and intellectual 
property rights
8 A typical application of dematerialised property are 
also legal concepts, so that a physical object as an 
instance of the res to which the property right relates 
(and which the property right by way of this relation 
creates) is actually not possible. This is the case of 
debts and intellectual property rights in particular.
9 The debt is an entirely legal creature with no 
physical appearance in nature. Some legal systems 
deny the debt proprietary quality (Germany, §§ 90, 
903 BGB), but functionally the debt is unquestionably 
property of the creditor (thus more precisely 
‘claim’, from the creditor’s perspective)27 which 
also materialises in the assignability of the debt to 
a new creditor. Transferability (in principle, but 
there may be transfer prohibitions) indicates the 
quality as property.28 As no physicality exists, the 
transfer or assignment cannot be made public by 
way of overt acts that denote and make apparent the 
change of attribution29 in form of a physical handing 
over or change of possession (delivery, traditio), so 
that legal systems insist on the compliance with 
certain formalities to perfect or make effective the 
assignment (for example intimation/information 
of the debtor of the assignment – the individual 
jurisdictions differ here). These formalities perform 
an evidentiary and a channelling function, to speak 
27 English legal language does not make a distinction between 
debt (debtor’s side of the obligation) and claim (creditor’s 
side), as for example German law and French law do, 
compare Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 13. 
28 For English law, see Gray and Gray (n 5) 96-98.
29 Or ‘ownership’ of the debt/claim, although some legal 
systems, for example Germany and Austria, avoid this term 
and talk about ‘Rechtszuständigkeit’ (attribution or allocation 
of the debt/claim) but functionally this is of course 
ownership, that is, the most unlimited form of allocation. 
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with Fuller.30 However, debts can be, and are often, 
reified in form of a corporeal reifier, that is, a paper 
that denotes, proves, and often even creates, the 
debt it represents. This is the case of negotiable 
instruments. The transfer of the debt can thus be 
made corporeal and visualised, and, particularly with 
bills of exchange, the formalised transfer of the debt 
(negotiation) carries further rights in connection 
with, and as a result of, that transfer (especially 
secondary liability).31
10 A special form of debt, where transferability is its 
very essence and purpose, is money. This becomes 
apparent if one looks at the money creation process. 
Bank money is discussed first, since bank money is 
today by far the more important form of money 
compared to cash (about 97% of all circulating 
money is bank money),32 and since bank money is 
historically older than the modern system of cash 
that replaced the old forms of commodity money and 
commodity-backed money of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Bank money is created 
when a bank grants a loan to its customer. The bank 
credits the customer’s account with the loan sum, 
so that the bank, as account provider, is debtor of 
the customer in respect of the loan sum, while the 
customer, as borrower, is insofar creditor, as if the 
customer had paid funds (e.g. cash) into his account 
with the bank. At the same time, the bank, as lender, 
is creditor to the customer who as the borrower has to 
repay the loan debt to the bank. The money, in form 
of the granted loan sum in the bank account (bank 
money), is therefore a circulating debt (or circulating 
credit from the creditor’s perspective): it appears as 
an asset of the customer-borrower in his account 
and can therefore be transferred to a third party 
for the payment of goods or services obtained from 
this third party. That third party, upon receipt of the 
bank money in his account, can use this money for 
the payment of a fourth party – so the debt or money 
circulates in the economy. However, independent 
of that circulation the borrower has to repay the 
loan granted, invariably together with interest.33 
Money, being circulating debt or credit, and at the 
same time loan debt, is therefore a janiform debt 
30 Lon L. Fuller, ‘Consideration and Form’, (1941) 41 (5) 
Columbia Law Review, 800-801.
31 E.g. M. A. Clarke, R. J. A. Hooley, R. J. C. Munday, L. S. Sealy, 
A. M. Tettenborn, P. G. Turner, Commercial Law: Text, Cases, 
and Materials (5th edn) (Oxford University Press, 2017) 691, 
699, for English law.
32 Bank of England (McLeay, Michael, Radia, Amar and Thomas, 
Ryland), ‘Money Creation in the Modern Economy’, (2014) 
Quarterly Bulletin Q1, 15.
33 Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 66-69, with further 
discussion and references.
or a janiform money-debt res (property object): it is 
(a) a loan debt which stays between bank as lender 
and customer as borrower, (b) it circulates as debt 
in the economy because it is used for payment to 
discharge money debts (typically as a result of sales 
contracts) and thereby operates as, and is, money. 
Gradual repayment of the loan debt reduces and 
extinguishes the debt and destroys money which 
the debt constitutes.34 Obviously the repayment of a 
loan only destroys money in relation to the amount 
of money circulating in the economy as a whole; it 
does not destroy the particular circulating sum of 
money which was created on the grant of that loan in 
question, because the loan debt and the circulating 
debt are separated from one another as from the 
first payment of the borrower out of his account to 
the third party.35
11 Cash, as the most important form of central bank 
money, is conceptually not different to commercial 
bank money or simply ‘bank money’, only that the 
circulating debt is issued by a central bank and 
effectively not redeemable, for example in gold, 
since the gold standard has long been abolished. 
Furthermore, the debt is represented by a banknote, 
technically a promissory note or IOU (the English 
banknotes are still styled as promissory notes), 
so that the creditor is the holder of the banknote 
(a bearer instrument) and the debtor the central 
bank (which is in turn the creditor of the state or 
government at whose behest the central bank issues 
cash). The banknote therefore represents both the 
moveable property-res (as the physical paper) and the 
debt-res (as the money this note denotes). The debt-
res (money) that is represented by the banknote as a 
social reifier and (technically) negotiable instrument 
is practically nugatory, because claiming payment 
of the debt embodied in the banknote entitles only 
to payment by other banknotes, and necessarily in 
full and final satisfaction of the debt, so that the 
debt is self-referential.36 While in the case of cash 
the money debt-res is represented by a banknote as 
a social reifier or physical object that is (especially 
historically) a negotiable instrument, there is hardly 
any representation of the bank money-debt res: the 
representation of the bank money debt effectively 
amounts to its creation: a written line of numbers 
on a bank account statement.37
34 Bank of England (n 32) 16.
35 Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 67, 72, 81-83, 201.
36 Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 63-64. There are very rare 
cases where the debt represented by a banknote is not 
nugatory, see ibid at 64.
37 Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 23-24.
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12 Bank money is in reality electronic money today. 
The times when bank money was recorded in the 
paper books of the bank, for example the money 
created following the grant of a loan (‘fountain pen 
money’) are long gone. Bank money is recorded or 
created by way of input of computer data. It is also 
possible to replace physical cash or paper money by 
digital cash or ‘e-money’, and projects of this kind 
already exist.38 Besides, there are private digital 
currencies, such as Bitcoin or Ethernet. What the 
quality of these types of money is from a legal (not 
technological) perspective, depends particularly on 
the origin of that money (that is, who is the issuer), 
and is a complicated matter.39 However, relevant 
in this context is that, according to the concept of 
dematerialised property, it is possible that the res 
is represented by a physical object (cash), but this 
is not necessary (bank money, electronic money).
13 Intellectual property rights are not debts. With 
financial assets, such as money, a debtor is required 
to create the asset: no debtor – no creditor – no 
asset. Hence the complete repayment of a money 
debt as a result of a loan destroys money40 because 
it extinguishes the debt which money constitutes. 
Intellectual property is not a financial asset, 
because there is no debtor who would otherwise be 
indispensable for the creation and the maintenance 
of this form of res. Intellectual property rights are 
rather ‘real assets’, therefore conceptually related 
to tangible assets (not to financial assets), that is, to 
res represented by physical objects. However, while 
in case of tangible property a physical object that 
represents a res reifies the res directly (e.g. land, 
a car), intellectual property rights as necessarily 
incorporeal legal concepts can only have an indirect 
reifier in form of a physical object. Copyright 
illustrates that nicely. The physical copy of a book, 
for example, represents, as a tangible reifier, directly 
the res of the corporeal property, and that is what 
the buyer of the book obtains as the new owner after 
a sale of the book to him. The copy of the book also 
represents indirectly the res of the copyright in the 
text, the literary work which the text constitutes. 
This copyright-property in the res is not transferred 
with the sale of the physical copy. Thus the physical 
object, the copy of the book, is direct reifier of the 
moveable property res and at the same time indirect 
reifier of the copyright-res.41 Here the situation of 
38 Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 21, 24.
39 Further discussion in Rahmatian, Credit and Creed (n 3) 94-
103, 150, with further references.
40 Bank of England (n 32) 16, and above.
41 Compare Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle 1992, art. L. 111-
3: ‘La propriété incorporelle définie par l’article L. 111-1 est 
indépendante de la propriété de l’objet matériel.’
intellectual property is conceptually similar to the 
banknote, as we have seen before. This is even more 
accentuated in the case of the visual arts. While text, 
or literary works can exist in an intangible form (the 
oral traditions of epic poetry are such an example), 
visual arts require a tangible expression for their 
very existence: the oil on canvas is reifier of the legal 
concept ‘moveable property’ and at the same time 
for the legal concept ‘intellectual property’ in the 
form ‘artistic work’.42 Hence the copyright system of 
the UK requires recording or fixation for copyright 
protection for literary, dramatic and musical works, 
but not explicitly for artistic works,43 because an 
artistic work cannot come into existence without 
fixation. The case of music is more complicated 
because the musical score, for example, does not 
necessarily represent the musical work as such, so 
that the refier of the copyright res directed at the 
musical work is further removed from the res it 
represents.44
14 With patents the intellectual property (res) is 
represented by the specific text of the patent as 
granted, particularly the claims which create the 
patent-res, not by a machine incorporating the 
patent (if such a machine exists already).45 It could 
not be otherwise because the delineation and 
extent of the property right cannot be provided by 
a representing physical object, as would be in case 
of tangible property. As the patent is an abstract 
legal concept, it is the law as the originator of the 
concept which must create and define the extent 
and content of the patent through the written text 
of the patent specification. For that the law cannot 
rely on the qualities of an existing physical object in 
the natural world. (Registered) trade marks are now 
regarded as property in their own right, not merely 
as signifiers of goodwill of a business. Thus a trade 
mark is indirect refier of the res ‘business goodwill’ 
(origin, quality and communication functions of the 
trade mark) and direct reifier of the res ‘sign’ in form 
of a graphical representation (in case of the classical 
pictorial mark or a word).46
42 Rahmatian, Dematerialised Property (n 3) 17.
43 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 3 (2).
44 Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (n 26) 18.
45 Rahmatian, Dematerialised Property (n 3) 375-376.
46 Rahmatian, Dematerialised Property (n 3) 378.
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D. Applications of dematerialised 
property II: data, digitised objects
I. Data
15 Having discussed the established examples of 
intangible and tangible property as versions of the 
res, one can now consider phenomena where their 
proprietary nature is much less certain. The pure and 
strict application of the conception of dematerialised 
property does not pose any particular difficulties 
when data and digitised objects are to be included 
as further forms of dematerialised property. The 
problem is rather whether the effects of such an 
incorporation are desirable from a legal policy 
perspective.47
16 In a modern, service industry-oriented economy 
it is advantageous to give up on the materiality 
or physicality of an object as a prerequisite for 
qualifying as property. The concept of dematerialised 
property emphasises the constructive nature of the 
legal idea of property: it is not a material object from 
which property rights flow, but the abstract legal 
concept of property rights rather brings property or 
‘things’ in law into existence, so that any physicality 
is legally irrelevant. Accordingly, data can also be 
defined as ‘res’ by the law, and become (incorporeal) 
property, similar to debts and intellectual property 
rights.
17 However, a complete incorporation of data as just 
another form of property into the existing property 
regime of private law systems can cause some 
difficulties.48 The obvious problem is the practical 
effect of the property right to which data are 
47 See Hoeren and Bitter (n 25) 347-348. See also, from 
the perspective of German law, and its narrow concept 
of ‘thing’ (Sache) in § 90 BGB, Jürgen Kühling, Florian 
Sackmann, „Rechte an Daten: Regulierungsbedarf 
aus Sicht des Verbraucherschutzes?“, Berlin: 
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V., (2018) 7-8, 
available at: <https://www.vzbv.de/sites/default/files/
downloads/2018/11/26/18-11-01_gutachten_kuehling-
sackmann-rechte-an-daten.pdf> (visited 28/05/2020).
48 A discussion of this problem from a US-American 
perspective by Jorge L. Contreras, ‘The false promise of 
health data ownership’, (2019) 94(4) New York University Law 
Review, 634-636, especially the test whether an intangible 
could be property, according to Kremen v. Cohen, 337 
F.3d 1024, at 1030 (9th Cir. 2003): ‘First, there must be an 
interest capable of precise definition; second, it must be 
capable of exclusive possession or control; and third, the 
putative owner must have established a legitimate claim to 
exclusivity.’ (According to the Court, domain names would 
satisfy these criteria).
supposed to be subjected to: (i) what exactly is the 
property object (the res, or its reification in a given 
concrete example), (ii) what is the content of the real 
right in relation to data? (iii) who is the property 
right allocated to? (iv) how can this allocation be 
changed, that is, how can ownership in the data be 
transferred? The following discussion will consider 
these aspects in turn.
18 (i) While with conventional property, also 
incorporeal property, the property object can 
usually be made out quite clearly (a copyright in a 
literary work, a debt arising from a contract of sale), 
with data the matter is less clear. Unlike specific 
incorporeal things, data are rarely single individual 
data or objects, but data sets, large amounts of data, 
which are a kind of universitas rerum,49 thus an object 
of property which consists of many separate parts 
forming a whole, such as a flock of sheep, a library 
or a business. In contrast to these usual examples, 
an amount of data normally and quickly grows, 
and, furthermore, can be duplicated and copied 
as true unaltered digital copies of the original, so 
that the extent of a given universitas rerum of data 
cannot be ascertained clearly at a given time. It may 
also be difficult to separate and distinguish clearly 
one universitas rerum or set of data from another 
set of data, but that would be necessary for an 
unambiguous allocation to a certain right-holder 
or owner. A herd of cattle could not be multiplied 
quickly, and not at all through ‘electronic’ copying, 
and every cow could be ascertained as being part 
of a certain universitas rerum by way of earmarks or 
branding (hence the ‘maverick (cattle) laws’ in some 
States of the USA).50 Therefore an analysis of the 
possible proprietary quality of data which seeks to 
establish parallels with universitas rerum, such as an 
enterprise or even a herd of animals, must probably 
fail. The separate parts of this universitas rerum do 
not grow in an unregulated arbitrary manner and 
particularly do not reproduce as identical copies like 
digital copies of data. In addition, a herd of animals 
can be delimited and remains ascertainable because 
the animals keep together because of their natural 
instincts. Data obviously do not have these qualities. 
49 ‘Gesamtsache’ in German legal language, see e.g. § 302 
Austrian ABGB. The German BGB does not have this term.
50 A maverick cow was an unbranded cow so that it could not 
be allocated to an owner. ‘Maverick laws’ would provide 
sales, ownership allocation rules and access to land rights 
in relation to such unbranded cattle, for example the 
Wyoming Legislative Assembly’s 1884 ‘Act to Provide for the 
Gathering and Sale of Mavericks’, see James Winton Eaton, 
‘The Wyoming Stock Growers Association’s Treatment 
of Nonmember Cattlemen during the 1880s’, (1984) 58 (1) 
Agricultural History, 71.
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19 Furthermore, the incorporeal nature of data prevents 
possession as it can be exercised with regard to 
physical things. Possession would also assist in 
defining the object of property in question. However, 
the equivalent of ‘possession of a right’ (‘Rechtsbesitz’ 
in German legal language) could be implemented by 
exercising the right. Change of possession and the 
connected act of publicity as an indication of change 
of ownership is not available with incorporeal data 
either, nor can an apparent authority be founded in 
relation to data, being an ‘appearance of having the 
right’ (‘Rechtsschein’ in German legal language), the 
central reason for the justification of the exception 
to the nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet 
or nemo dat-rule.51 A transfer of data rights (and data 
as objects – again the res appears to be created by the 
real rights) would realistically have to be subjected 
to particular formality rules (see below under iv).
20 It is therefore not clear which object the data 
ownership right would really refer to at a given 
moment, in contrast to, say, a specific claim to 
deliver or to pay the price in a particular sales 
contract which is directed as a specifiable object 
of property. This could also become problematic 
if one envisages the possibility of subordinate real 
rights of security over data. If data are to be property 
then at least theoretically they could be pledged or 
subjected to another security right as any moveable 
or also incorporeal property: many jurisdictions 
have the assignment in security, and patents or 
trade marks can be mortgaged or equivalent security 
rights granted over them. From a legal policy 
perspective, it would be advisable to prohibit the 
grant of security rights over data altogether, not 
only because it potentially undermines the intended 
protection of the data subject, but also because it 
avoids the problem of the principle of speciality for 
the grant of security rights in civil law jurisdictions 
(English law does not have such a restriction, as the 
institute of the floating charge shows).52 According 
to this speciality principle (Spezialitätsgrundsatz 
in German legal language), a creation of a pledge 
over things in their entirety, without identifying 
a specific res to which the pledge shall attach, is 
impossible.53 However, German law, for example, 
allows a security in collective entities of moveables, 
but whether data would be able to benefit from this 
51 E.g. Andreas Rahmatian, ‘A Comparison of German Moveable 
Property Law and English Personal Property Law’, (2008) 3 
(1) Journal of Comparative Law, 225, with further references.
52 The floating charge is only available for companies, see John 
Birds, Daniel Attenborough, Mark Leiser, Matteo Solinas, 
Michael R Varney, Zinian Zhang, Boyle & Birds’ Company Law, 
10th ed. (LexisNexis, 2019), 305.
53 See e.g. Rahmatian, German Moveable Property (n 51) 230-231, 
with further references.
wider interpretation of the speciality principle is 
very doubtful, given that the pledge and similar 
security rights are based on the physicality of the 
property and on possession which become naturally 
impossible in the case of data.
21 One also has to distinguish between the data carrier 
(a CD-ROM, USB-stick etc.) and the data on it. The 
problem resembles that of copyright where the 
ownership transfer of the physical work does not 
entail the transfer of the copyright in the work, 
and physical object and copyright follow different 
ownership and property transfer rules (those of 
moveable property and of intellectual property, 
respectively).54 This also applies to works of art, 
thus the purchase of a painting does not include 
the transfer of the artist’s copyright to the buyer 
of the painting. However, this idea had not been 
taken for granted but developed over the years. 
For example, the old Austrian Author’s Rights Act 
of 1846 contained a presumption of the transfer of 
the author’s right together with the purchase and 
ownership transfer of works of art.55
22 In a similar vein, the data carrier follows the 
usual rules of moveable property, while data, if 
conceptualised as property, are subjected to their 
own property rules, and transfer of ownership 
of one does not automatically entail transfer of 
ownership of the other. The discussion in English 
law and Scots law about whether software is to be 
regarded as ‘goods’ within the meaning of the Sale 
of Goods Act 197956 or not illustrates this. A recent 
decision of the English Court of Appeal,57 following, 
inter alia, earlier Scottish authority,58 decided that 
the supply of software without tangible media is not 
to be regarded as a sale of ‘goods’. An earlier English 
case59 clarified that a computer disc is within the 
definition of ‘goods’, while a program, of itself, is 
not. The statutory definition of ‘goods’ in the Sale of 
Goods Act which excludes ‘choses in action’, that is, 
54 See above under 3.
55 § 11 of Allerhöchstes Patent vom 19. October 1846 zum 
Schutze des literarischen und artistischen Eigenthums gegen 
unbefugte Veröffentlichung, Nachdruck und Nachbildung, 
Justizgesetzsammlung 1846, Nr. 992, S. 375.
56 Sale of Goods Act 1979, s. 61 (1): ‘goods’ includes all personal 
chattels other than things in action and money.
57 Computer Associates UK Ltd. v. The Software Incubator Ltd. 
[2018] EWCA Civ 518, [2018] ECC 25, especially paras. 30-34.
58 Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd 1996 
S.L.T. 604.
59 St Albans DC v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All E.R. 481; 
[1997] F.S.R 251.
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debts, aims at the corporality of the res (or its refier, 
respectively) for such a distinction: in the case of 
a physical object the Sale of Goods Act applies; in 
the case of software (being also a particular form 
of data), which could be seen as analogous to debts 
and other incorporeal property, copyright applies.60 
However, one has to distinguish between what the 
objective of copyright protection is and what a sui 
generis protection of data aims at, even where the 
phenomenon in question is both data and copyright 
work, such as with computer programmes (below 
under (iii)). 
23 (ii) All real rights, particularly the most extensive 
and most important one, ownership, can be analysed 
as having an internal side (broadly, the right to use) 
and an external side (broadly, the right to exclude).61 
Intellectual property rights as intangible property 
rights can be used as guidance for the application of 
these principles to data to ascertain the content of 
data ownership. In the case of intellectual property 
rights, the right to use materialises particularly in 
the right to use or exploit in accordance with the 
nature and the rules of the intellectual property 
right in question, for example with regard to 
copyright/author’s right, the use manifests itself in 
the ‘acts restricted by copyright’ (in the UK)62 or the 
‘Verwertungsrechte’ (in Germany).63 Furthermore, an 
essential aspect of the right to use is the right to 
assign and to license.64 The right to exclude manifests 
itself in the infringement provisions which mirror 
the acts restricted by the intellectual property right.
24 Theoretically, the incorporeal property ‘data’ could 
have a similar regime. The practical realisation 
however requires a more adjusted definition. The 
most important rights in relation to data are (i) 
access to (and information about) personal data, 
and (ii) controlling the use,65 processing and transfer 
of, personal data by the person from whom these 
personal data have been collected. The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides such rights 
60 In relation to the contractual (not proprietary) side the UK 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss. 33 et seq. applies now when 
the supply of ‘digital content’ (data which are produced and 
supplied in digital form) is involved, provided the contract 
is concluded between a trader and a consumer (ibid s. 2).
61 Compare § 903 BGB for a standard definition of the 
ownership right.
62 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss. 16 et seq.
63 §§ 15 et seq. German Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965.
64 For copyright in the UK and other jurisdictions, see e.g. 
Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (n 26) 201-208.
65 That includes the erasure of data.
already in arts. 13, 15, 17, 18 and 20 in particular.66 
However, these rights are specific rights granted by 
public law (administrative law) and not instances 
of property ownership under private law (ius 
utendi, fruendi, abutendi): thus a right which has not 
specifically been granted by law (typically a statute) 
cannot be assumed to exist. In contrast, the private 
law approach to ownership considers ownership as 
the widest possible property right67 of which the 
scope is only restricted by specific public law (e.g. 
building regulations) and private law rules (e.g. 
rights of way in land law, permitted acts/defences in 
intellectual property law), but otherwise unlimited 
and not in need of legislative intervention that 
identifies the existence or exercise of a concrete 
right of exploitation. Even if data ownership were 
introduced in the form of Immaterialgüterrechte 
(‘rights of incorporeal goods’, an attractive 
option in Germany for systemic reasons), it would 
structurally still be an individual quasi-ownership 
right of a citizen under private law for the purpose 
of use and exclusion: this is a functional (dynamic) 
interpretation of ownership which does not adhere 
(statically) to any materiality of a property object.68 
Any public law regulation is therefore necessarily 
more casuistic and at the risk of becoming obsolete 
soon if not updated regularly. The private law/
property approach is invariably more elastic, but less 
exact which makes a constitutional law assessment 
of proportionality and of the balance of conflicting 
interests in respect of human rights less predictable 
(e.g. privacy against collection, use and transfer of 
data).69 However, the practical result, for example 
in relation to sensitive health data, may well be the
66 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 4. 5. 2016 OJ 
L 119/1.
67 E.g. Antony M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in: Antony G. Guest 
(ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (First Series) (Oxford 
University Press, 1961) 107-147, at 108, 112. See also the 
legal definitions in § 903 German BGB, § 354 Austrian ABGB, 
Art 544 French Code Civil, Art 641 Swiss ZGB.
68 Karl-Heinz Fezer, Repräsentatives Dateneigentum: Ein 
zivilgesellschaftliches Bürgerrecht (Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, 2018) 14, 48 available at: <https://www.kas.de/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=f828a351-a2f6-11c1-b720-
1aa08eaccff9&groupId=252038> (visited 29/05/2020).
69 Such a proportionality test also appears in Directive 95/46/
EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 6 (1) (f).
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same, whether achieved through public law control 
by the data subject or private law ownership by the 
data owner.70
25 (iii) An additional problem of an alignment of data 
ownership with traditional property ownership 
rules is that the creator of the property object as 
the ‘instantiation’ or reification (if any) of the 
res, the data, and the person entitled to the data 
(ownership) are not necessarily the same, as would 
normally be the case with the rules of accession and 
specification in moveable property71 or with the rules 
of authorship in copyright.72 Generally, ownership 
requires an owner, the beneficiary of the real right. 
In the case of data ownership, the ‘owner’ of the data 
entitled to the rights that this ownership confers 
is less clear-cut than, for example, with regard to 
copyright ownership.
26 One could assume that copyright could provide a 
good role model for data ownership allocation, the 
identification of the actual ‘owner’ of data collected 
or generated. Both apply to incorporeal property 
objects. However, what makes the issue murkier is 
that data can actually be copyright-property objects 
themselves if they are part of a computer programme 
or a database.73 The fact that a phenomenon or a 
physical entity or appearance can fall into two 
different regimes of regulation is nothing new. 
Within intellectual property for example, a typical 
overlap is the copyright protection which a 
figurative trade mark obtains as an artistic work.74 
Trade mark and copyright protection may apply 
simultaneously, but the protection mechanisms have 
different objectives (protection of the artistic work 
the trade mark’s design constitutes, protection of 
the business goodwill the trade mark denotes). In 
relation to the copy of a book, this copy is reifier of 
the tangible moveable property and of the literary
70 Barbara J. Evans, ‘Much Ado about Data Ownership’, (2011) 
25 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 74.
71 See, e.g., the comparison between the UK and Germany 
in relation to accession by Rahmatian, German Moveable 
Property (n 51) 227-229, with further references.
72 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 9 (1), § 7 
German Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965, French Code de la 
Propriété Intellectuelle 1992, art. L. 111-3.
73 E.g. Michal Koščík and Matěj Myška, ‘Database authorship 
and ownership of sui generis database rights in data-driven 
research’, (2017) 31(1) International Review of Law, Computers 
& Technology, 46-54.
74 E.g. Nuno de Araújo Sousa e Silva, The Ownership Problems 
of Overlaps in European Intellectual Property (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2014) 19-20.
work as copyright- property object, and subject to 
the respective different rules, as has been discussed 
before.
27 Data (if they are not just data per se) could be 
copyright-protected under certain circumstances, 
particularly if they are software. Besides, 
independent of a potential copyright protection, 
one could introduce a sui generis data property right. 
However, the different aims of copyright and of a 
possible data-ownership protection appear in the 
different ownership orientation. In case of copyright, 
the copyright owner is (initially at least if copyright 
can be assigned at all) the author, the maker of the 
copyright work, such as the writer of the novel, the 
composer of the piece of music, the maker of the 
database (where the database under its sui generis 
protection of the database right is additionally 
copyright-protected)75 or the programmer of the 
software.76 The idea of the protection is that the 
author can reap commercially the benefits of his 
or her work without undercutting and parasitical 
competition by competitors (the competition 
protection-oriented copyright approach) or that 
the personality of the author which is reflected in 
the work that he or she creates is protected (also) 
through the protection of that work (the personality-
protection approach of author’s rights).77
28 However, in the case of possible data ownership, 
the matter is different. Here the originator, creator, 
collector or controller of the data,78 to follow 
the terminology of the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR),79 who would be the owner of the 
data if the copyright model were followed, is, from 
a legal policy perspective, often not the preferred 
entitled person who could exercise (quasi) ownership 
rights over the data. The data ‘owner’ should rather 
be the data subject,80 that is, the person in relation to 
whom personal data have been generated, processed 
and collected, but not the person who has generated 
75 See UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 3A (2).
76 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss. 3(1)(b), 9, 
§§ 7, 69a (3) German Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965.
77 Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (n 26) 35, 47.
78 Often with a ‘processor’ of data as the controller’s agent. 
79 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 4. 5. 2016 OJ 
L 119/1, art 4 (7).
80 General Data Protection Regulation, Art 6 (1) (a), Art. 9 (1), 
Art. 13 and Recital 7; Banterle (n 25) 212.
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the data (controller) or has had generated the data 
for him (through a processor as agent) as the ‘data-
author’ in copyright terminology.81 In the case of 
data ownership, it does not matter who ‘created’ the 
personal data, what matters is who is affected by 
the data. The originator and generator of sensitive 
health data may be the doctor who diagnoses a heart 
disease, but the patient should be the beneficiary of 
a data ownership right, which he can then exercise 
to prevent the data from being passed on to his 
life insurance company. The GDPR takes this view 
in several provisions,82 though from a public law-
regulatory perspective, not as an instance of a 
private-law concept of ownership with the owner’s 
rights to use and to exclude which derive from that 
ownership right.83
29 There can also be a conflict between an existing 
copyright the data controller may have (as a result 
of electronic database and software-based data 
processing) and the rights of a data subject as a sui 
generis data owner. The GDPR briefly refers to such a 
conflict in Recital (63) and states that copyright and 
other intellectual property rights, while preserved in 
principle, cannot be used to prevent per se the data 
subject’s right of access to personal data.84 The issue 
as to whether, and to what extent, copyright can 
protect data, is a complicated one: data per se cannot 
attract copyright protection – they are information 
or ‘ideas’ in the system of copyright,85 although even 
information could get protection to a limited extent 
now if it qualifies as online use of parts of press 
publications.86 However, data collections, by virtue 
81 Particularly if Anglo-Saxon copyright philosophy were 
followed, then the processor of data would probably not 
be ‘owner’ of such data, because he processes the data on 
behalf of the controller, being an analogy to the ‘works 
made for hire’-doctrine in the USA, see US Copyright Act 
1976, 17 USC §§ 101, 201 (b).
82 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection 
Regulation), arts. 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21.
83 See above under (ii).
84 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection 
Regulation), Recital (63): ‘[The data subject’s right of access 
to personal data] should not adversely affect the rights or 
freedoms of others, including trade secrets or intellectual 
property and in particular the copyright protecting the 
software. However, the result of those considerations 
should not be a refusal to provide all information to the data 
subject.’
85 See e.g. Contreras (n 48) 630-631, for US law.
86 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights 
in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/
of their selection and arrangement, can be protected 
under copyright if they fulfil the copyright/author’s 
right originality requirement of the jurisdiction in 
question, or under database right if they constitute 
the database author’s ‘own intellectual creation’.87 
The extent to which the data subject (or data owner in 
a sui generis data ownership conception) can prevail 
over such conflicting intellectual property rights is 
ultimately an issue of weighing the incompatible 
interests against each other under constitutional 
law and to allow a proportionate restriction of the 
ownership right of intellectual property in favour 
of the public law right of data access or private law 
right of sui generis data ownership. Rights of freedom 
of expression which prevail over copyright and 
confidential information are familiar examples of 
such a conflict.88
30 (iv) If sui generis data ownership is recognised, the 
right to use will involve the right to transfer data 
under this ownership right. The transfer of data 
ownership within the system of existing private 
laws can lead to certain difficulties, particularly 
if one envisages a harmonised approach at least 
across Europe. However, such an approach is 
practically inevitable because the common use 
of data invariably entails data transfer, and, in 
contrast to land, the incorporeal nature of data 
makes a restriction to any one national jurisdiction 
impossible. Intellectual property rights show a 
similar characteristic and therefore have a long 
tradition of international harmonisation, for 
example by the TRIPS Agreement.89 A transfer of 
data in accordance with ordinary property transfer 
rules would force the data ownership transfer to 
comply with the specific different national systems 
of ownership transfer, notably, the abstract transfer 
of ownership or abstract real conveyance (Germany, 
Greece), or the causal transfer of ownership (Austria, 
Switzerland, Hungary etc.), or the consensual 
transfer of ownership (France, Belgium, Italy, and 
effectively also England within the scope of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979),90 whereby the consensual 
EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130, Art. 15, and Recital (58).
87 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
Databases, OJ L 77, Art. 3 (1). See also Banterle (2020: 206-
210).
88 For the UK, for example, see Lionel Bently, Brad Sherman, 
Dev Gangjee, Phillip Johnson, Intellectual Property Law (5th 
edn) (Oxford University Press, 2018) 257, 1256.
89 Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights 1995 (TRIPS Agreement).
90 UK Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 17, 18 rule 1. This provision 
also applies in Scotland.
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transfer of ownership is arguably a subset of the 
causal ownership transfer.91 One can test the transfer 
method of data ownership in the light of these 
different national legal traditions,92 but it is more 
expedient to stipulate a sui generis transfer method 
for data ownership. There is a perfect precedent for 
a separate transfer regime for incorporeal property: 
the transfer or assignment of intellectual property 
rights, for example the transfer of a trade mark to a 
new owner,93 or the assignment of copyright,94 where 
that is possible.95
31 Such a sui generis transfer method for data ownership 
could perhaps be provided in a harmonising 
instrument, such as an EU-Directive. It is not 
certain whether there are problems of competence 
of EU legislation in this regard, because property 
is an exclusive matter for the EU Member States.96 
That seems to be undisputable in relation to 
land (immoveable property), but with regard to 
intellectual property the issue is far less clear. 
There is a harmonising Trade Mark Directive97 
which does regulate trade mark transfers (with 
reference to national procedures for recording 
the transfers in the Member States’ registers, and 
91 Rahmatian, German Moveable Property (n 51) 217, 219.
92 Andreas Boerding, Nicolai Culik, Christian Doepke, 
Thomas Hoeren, Tim Juelicher, Charlotte Roettgen, Max V. 
Schoenfeld, ‘Data Ownership – A Property Rights Approach 
from a European Perspective’, (2018) 11 (2) Journal of Civil 
Law Studies, 342-346, 352-354.
93 E.g. UK Trade Marks Act 1994, s. 24; § 27 German Markengesetz 
1994; French Code de La Propriété Intellectuelle 1992, art. L. 
714-1.
94 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 90; French 
Code de La Propriété Intellectuelle 1992, art. L. 131-3 and 
art. L. 131-4; Michel Vivant and Jean-Michel Bruguière, Droit 
d’auteur et droits voisins, 2nd ed. (Dalloz, 2013) 672. On the 
distinction between cession and licence in French author’s 
rights law and its relative unimportance (compared to the 
UK), see Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (n 26) 205-208, 
with further references.
95 An assignment of the author’s right is not possible in 
Germany or Austria because of their monist systems of 
author’s right, see Germany, § 29 Urheberrechtsgesetz 1965, 
Austria, § 23 (3) Urheberrechtsgesetz 1936. On the monist 
system of author’s rights in the context of assignments, see 
Rahmatian, Copyright and Creativity (n 26) 49-51, 206-207.
96 This concern has been raised by Boerding et al. (n 92) 353. 
97 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of 
the Member States relating to trade marks (Text with EEA 
relevance), OJ L 336, p. 1–26.
these are essentially the same) – and trade marks 
are unquestionably property.98 Furthermore, the 
Trade Mark Regulation invents the creature of the 
EU trade mark which is an EU-property right (and 
the regulation obviously also contains trade mark 
transfer rules, including the formality requirement 
of registration of the transfer).99 For the possible 
proprietary nature of data and their transfer as 
property, the role model is more the trade mark than 
land, one would think. The dematerialised property 
concept rejects the tangible nature of some forms 
of property as a blueprint for all property rights at 
any rate. The method of concluding an international 
treaty between the EU Member States outside EU 
law to overcome jurisdictional problems (‘enhanced 
cooperation’), as has been done for the envisaged 
unified patent court system (Unified Patent Court 
Agreement),100 is also an option, but a controversial 
one.101 However, the future of the unified patent and 
its court system is in doubt at the moment anyway.102
32 The rules for the derivative acquisition of ownership 
are in fact directed more towards tangible property, 
so that transfer rules for incorporeal property, such 
as for the assignment of debts or the transfer of 
negotiable instruments, would be a more appropriate 
role model. In addition, although the abstract/causal/
98 ibid, art. 22.
99 Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on 
the European Union trade mark, OJ L 078, 24.3.2009, p.1, art. 
17. 
100 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, OJ C 175, 20. 6. 2013, 
p. 1–40, following the Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 
2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the creation of unitary patent protection, OJEU L 361, 31. 12. 
2012, p. 1.
101 Legal challenges against this form of law making by Italy 
and Spain, see CJEU C-274/11 and C-395/11 Spain and Italy 
v. Council. They were unsuccessful, ibid, paras. 36-37, 68, 77, 
82-83, 92.
102 This is not so much because the UK after Brexit (as from 1 
February 2020) decided not to cooperate, see ‘The Unified 
Patent Court after Brexit’, (European Parliament, At A 
Glance, JURI Committee) Policy Department for Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs PE 649.575, March 2020, 
available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/ATAG/2020/649575/IPOL_ATA(2020)649575_EN.pdf 
(accessed 16 April 2020). More problematic is that the 
German Constitutional Court rejected the adopted process of 
the accession of Germany to the Unified Patent Court system 
as unconstitutional, see German Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
Beschluss des Zweiten Senats vom 13. Februar 2020 - 2 BvR 
739/17 (issued 20 March 2020). The current coronavirus 
crisis will delay further a possible solution.
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consensual conveyance rules may be preserved 
technically in the case of the assignment of claims 
(debts), their actual realisation is rather merely 
notional. The causal conveyance as one version 
of ownership transfer may serve as an example. 
In Austria, ownership transfer requires a contract 
(title) directed at the transfer of ownership (such 
as a sale) and a traditio, the (actual or symbolical) 
delivery of the property in question to the acquirer 
(conveyance) to effect an ownership transfer (causal 
conveyance).103 The assignment of debts (Zession) 
theoretically follows this principle in Austrian law,104 
but the contract (the assignment agreement) and 
the conveyance (the actual assignment or cession) 
fall into one act in reality, particularly since the 
assignment itself can be effected without any 
formalities, only that it becomes enforceable against 
the debtor once the assignment has been intimated to 
him.105 Theoretically this process complies with the 
principle of the contract as the necessary cause for 
the validity of the conveyance, but that amounts to 
a doctrinal legal reinterpretation without becoming 
apparent (or relevant) in social reality. A practical 
solution for the transfer of data ownership would be, 
as a constitutive formality rule, a written instrument 
signed by the owner and transferor of the data to 
effect a valid transfer of data ownership, similar to 
the assignment of copyright provision in the UK.106
II. Digitised objects
33 From an IT-perspective, digitised objects also 
constitute a form of data, but from a property 
theorist’s perspective, they are theoretically a 
creation of a separate virtual (that is, incorporeally 
represented) res from a tangible prototype, thus, for 
example, a painting or a letter and the digitisation of it. 
For the idea of dematerialised property the difference 
only refers to the reifier, not to the concept itself. 
However, the digitised copy would hardly become 
the object of separate copyright protection (or 
perhaps neighbouring rights protection in author’s 
rights countries), because usually there would not be 
more than format-shifting copying or reproduction 
(from paper to electronic digitisation) which could 
not attract separate copyright. The matter is not 
entirely clear-cut, because the English courts 
have given copyright protection to a photograph 
103 § 380 Austrian ABGB.
104 E.g. Helmut Koziol and Rudolf Welser, Grundriß des 
bürgerlichen Rechts, Vol 1: Allgemeiner Teil und Schuldrecht, 9th 
ed. (Manz Verlag, 1992), 292.
105 §§ 1393, 1395, 1396 Austrian ABGB.
106 See UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s. 90 (3).
taken from a picture in Graves’ Case,107 and it is not 
a far-stretching legal analogy to consider digitised 
copies as equivalent to photographs. Whether 
Graves’ Case has survived the ruling of the CJEU in 
Painer108 and in similar cases,109 is however doubtful 
(and in turn, it is not predictable if and how CJEU-
judgments remain relevant as persuasive authority 
in Britain after Brexit). In any case, if the digitised 
copy achieves the required European originality 
standard of ‘own intellectual creation’110 (that could 
be difficult in practice for mere digitisations), then it 
will obtain copyright protection in its own right. If, 
however, the digitisation cannot be brought under 
an intellectual property right (copyright) at all, 
then it is not a res, but a nullum, in law, because the 
real right creates the thing.111 There may be unfair 
competition protection remedies for such digitised 
copies in continental European countries, such as 
Germany and Austria (‘ergänzender Leistungsschutz’, 
‘Ausbeutung’, a protection against parasitical free-
ride),112 but these remedies do not create or confer 
a real right, so there is still no res.
34 However, if there is a selection or arrangement 
of digitised copies, there can be protection by a 
database right113 and, if an underlying software is 
involved, separate copyright protection for that 
software would apply,114 though not for the single 
digitised object (copy). The potentially disconcerting 
107 Graves’ Case (1869) LR 4 QB 715.
108 Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH, Axel Springer AG, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung GmbH, Spiegel-Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG, 
Verlag M. DuMont Schauberg Expedition der Kölnischen Zeitung 
GmbH & Co KG (C-145/10).
109 The first of its kind was Infopaq International v. Danske 
Dagblades Forening (C-5/08).
110 Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH and others (C-145/10) paras. 
86-92.
111 See above under B.
112 Germany: § 4 (3) UWG 2004 (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, Unfair Competition Act), and Horst-Peter 
Götting, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz, 9th ed. (C. H. Beck, 2010) 
74-75; Austria § 1 (1) (1) UWG 1984 (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb, Unfair Competition Act), and Andreas Wiebe et 
al., Wettbewerbs- und Immaterialgüterrecht, 4th ed. (Facultas 
Verlag, 2018) 332-333.
113 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
Databases, OJ L 77, Art. 1 (1) and (2).
114 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer 
programs (codified version), OJ L 111, Art. 1 (1) and (3).
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aspect of this protection regime is that a prototype, 
which is in the public domain itself (for example 
a baroque painting) can be ‘cocooned’ by layers 
of protection for the digitised version, so that the 
original is effectively dragged out of the public 
domain and covered by copyright, particularly 
if access to the original work is in reality only 
made possible through the digitised copy. The 
prohibition of the circumvention of technological 
measures against copying in the Information Society 
Directive115 reinforces this effect.
E. Conclusion
35 Debts, money, intellectual property, and – to the 
extent to which one is able to or wants to recognise 
property rights in them – data and digitised 
objects, are all versions of the general principle 
of dematerialised property. Property is a normative 
creation, it is not dependent on, or attaches to, a 
physical object in the real world – that is conceptually 
irrelevant. ‘Property’ is a creature of the law: the 
exclusive rights to a thing or res, the property rights 
or real rights, actually create the property or res by 
protecting it erga omnes. The physical objects in the 
natural world (natural or man-made ones) are only 
recognised by, and incorporated in, the system of 
the law by attaching property rights to them: only 
then they are objects or ‘things’ for the purpose of 
the law, otherwise they are non-existent for the law. 
An intangible object, such as an intellectual property 
right, is also created by the law, but there is no 
physical object which represents this res, at least not 
directly. Again, the law (qua property rights) creates 
the thing, here one with no physical manifestation. 
The same idea can be applied to data if one wants 
to establish a concept of data ownership. However, 
that is ultimately a decision of legal policy, not of 
property law and legal theory. 
115 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167, Art. 6.
